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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
©lis is an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the 
jurisdiction conferred on the Court by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as 
amended). The Division of Real Estate seeks judicial review of a decision of 
the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County, oixiering payment from 
the Real Estate Recovery Fund of $5f750 per person involved in a single real 
estate transaction for a total recovery of $23,000, in contravention of Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l) which limits recovery to $10,000 per single 
transaction. 
DISPOSITION BEDCW 
Respondents obtained a judgment against Steven Carter for $34,026.31. 
After unsuccessfully trying to obtain payment frcm Carter, Respondents then 
petitioned the District Court for an order directing the Utah Division of Real 
Estate of the Department of Business Regulation to pay Respondents out of the 
Real Estate Recovery Fund. The District Court granted Respondents petition in 
the amount of $23,000 or $5,750 per person. The Division appealed this 
decision to the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court incorrectly interpreted the Real 
Estate Recovery Fund Act to allcw payment on a "per claiitant" rather than on a 
"per transaction" basis? 
2. Whether the District Court erred in oixiering payment to the 
petitioners on an individual basis, \riien the underlying judgment did not make 
a finding of individual damges? 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE 
The following statutes are determinative of th i s case, and must 
therefore be considered by the Court: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2a-l, et seq. (1953 as amended), 
known as the "Real Estate Recovery Fund Act." 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 68-3 -11 , 68 -3 -12(1 ) (a ) and 
68 -3 -12 (2 ) (1 ) (1953 as amended). 
Due t o the length of these s t a t u t e s , they are 
reproduced in f u l l in the Appendix. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the Distr ict Court's decision allowing 
each person t o recover $5,750. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This i s an appeal from the order of the F i f th J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t Court granting recovery t o the p e t i t i o n e r s below i n the 
amount of $5750 apiece for a t o t a l of $23,000. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The McBrides obtained a judgment on January 30, 1087 aga ins t 
Steven R. Carter and SRC Investment Company. That judgment found 
that Carter had committed fraud and misrepresentat ion i n a rea l 
e s t a t e t ransac t ion with the McBrides. On or about May 16, 1988, 
the McBrides f i l e d a p e t i t i o n in the F i f th J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t 
Court for Washington County seeking an order d i r e c t i n g payment of 
the unpaid Carter judgment from the Real Estate Recovery Fund. A 
memorandum was f i l ed with the court by the Utah Attorney 
General ' s Office as counsel for the Division of Real Esta te on 
behalf of the Real Es ta te Recovery Fund. The Division admitted 
t h a t the Recovery Fund was l i a b l e for $10,000 to the McBrides, 
but denied any payment in excess of t ha t was s t a t u t o r i l y 
poss ib l e . Oral argument on the case was heard on July 12, 1988. 
Judge Eves granted the McBride's p e t i t i o n and ordered the 
Division of Real Esta te to pay each of the McBrides $5750 from 
the Recovery Fund. Judgment was entered on July 28, 1988 and the 
Division of Real Es ta te f i l ed a Notice of Appeal on August 23, 
1988. The appeal was o r ig ina l l y f i l ed in the Utah Court of 
Appeals, but was t ransfe r red to the Utah Supreme Court upon 
motion by the Division of Real Estate for j u r i s d i c t i o n a l reasons. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 30, 1987, respondents, Don W. McBride, Yvonne Z. 
McBride, James G. McBride and Paula S. McBride ("McBrides") obtained a final 
judgment in the Distr ict Court of Washington County, State of Utah ("distr ict 
court"), against Steven R. Carter and SRC Investment Company ("Carter") for 
the amount of $34,026.31, representing $23,000.00 in actual damages suffered 
as a resul t of fraud and misrepresentation oonmitted by Carter, as well as 
$5000 in punitive danages, and $6,026.31 in attorney's fees and court costs. 
(R. 89, 90) The McBrides, co-investors in property purchased from Carter, 
received thei r judgment as a group. The court did not mke any finding that 
the McBrides were injured individually, and did not assess the damages per 
capita. The court found that Carter, a licensed real estate agent, had 
oormitted five fraudulent acts against Respondents. (R. 89, 90) 
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The McBrides nade searches and inquiries to locate assets of Carter in 
order to collect on their judgment, but without success. To date no amount 
has been received or collected leaving the entire judgment of $34,026.31 
unpaid. (R. 98) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §61-2a-5, Respondents petitioned the District 
Court for an order directing the Utah Division of Real Estate of the 
Department of Business Regulation ("Division") to pay Respondents $29,026.31 
out of the Real Estate Recovery Fund ("Recovery Fund" or "Fund"). The amount 
requested represented the entire judgment against the original defendants less 
$5,000.00 awarded as punitive damages. (R. 98, 99) 
Respondents' petition was heard before the District Court of Washington 
County, State of Utah, on July 12, 1988. John L. Miles, counsel for the 
Respondents, presented oral argument in siipport of the petition. Counsel for 
the Division, Sheila Page, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of 
the Recovery Fund and presented argument opposing payment of more than 
$10,000.00 frcm the Recovery Fund in accordance with the limitation found in 
Utah Code Ann. §61-2a-5(l). (R. 158) The Division did acknowledge that the 
Respondents were entitled to receive $10,000.00 frcm the Recovery Fund. (R. 
159) 
The District Court, in ruling on the petition, made the following 
findings of facts: 
a. That Respondents had filed a proper petition and had met all 
conditions required fcy law for recovery frcm the Recovery Fund. 
b. That Respondents sustained actual danages of $23,000.00 which 
were included in the $34,026.31 judgment against Carter. 
c. That at all relevant times Carter was a real estate licensee. 
d. That none of the above judgment against Carter had been 
received or collected. 
- A _ 
e. That the applicable statute in this natter should be the 
statute in effect at the time Respondents filed their petition for 
recovery from the Recovery Fund and not the Recovery Fund statute in 
effect at the time the original complaint was filed against the original 
def aidants. 
f. That the statute in effect when the petition was filed on or 
about May 16, 1988 does not allcw for recovery of punitive damges, 
attorney fees, interest or court costs and that as a result Respondents 
could not recover nore than the $23,000 in actual damages frcm the 
Recovery Fund. 
g. That Utah Code Ann. §61-2a-5 is not clear in reference to 
instances where there are multiple claimants, but the court finds that 
each individual who has sustained actual damages nay bring a claim 
against the recovery fund with each individual claim being limited to 
$10,000.00 for a single transaction. 
h. That each of the four individual respondents suffered actual 
damages of $5,750.00 (being one-fourth of the $23,000.00 actual damages 
included in the original judgment) and that each was entitled to receive 
$5,750.00 frcm the Real Estate Recovery Fund, or to claim up to 
$10,000.00 each. (R. 159-160) 
The District Court thereby directed the Division to pay frcm the Real 
Estate Recovery Fund the sum of $5,750.00 to each of the four Respondents for 
a total payment of $23,000.00, the amount of uncollected actual daitages 
included in the original judgment which remained unpaid. (R. 162) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it accords considerable deference to 
the decisions of the trial courts unless there is a shewing that the court 
abused its discretion and misapplied the law. The trial court in this case 
misapplied the provisions of the Recovery Fund Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-l, 
et seq., (1953 as amsnded), to the petition filed by the McBrides. The judge 
ordered the Recovery Fund to pay the McBrides each $5750, for a total of 
$23,000, in contravention of the wording of the statute which limits recovery 
to $10,000 per transaction. 
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Judge Eves based his decision to award $5750 to each of the four 
McBrides on the fact that the Recovery Fund Act refers to those who may bring 
a claim against the fund as "persons." Judge Eves does not follow the rule of 
construction provided in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)(a), which says that the 
"singular embraces the plural" and the "plural embraces the singular." 
The use of the general term "person" must yield to the more 
specific term "per transaction," which is clearly a limitation on recovery 
intended by the legislature. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said that when the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts are required to give it effect. 
The wording of § 61-2a-5(l), "No recovery may be more than $10fQ00 for a 
single transaction and no more than $50,000 for any one licensee," is clear 
and unambiguous. The district court's interpretation requires inferring 
language into the statute, such as "not more than $10,000 per person per 
transaction." 
Should the Court determine that the statute is not clear and 
unambiguous, then the legislative intent and purpose must be examined. The 
Court need only look to the intent specified in the statute to harmonize the 
language of the statute with the intent and purpose of the act. The Recovery 
Fund was enacted to establish a fund to reimburse the public for damges 
incurred by defaulting real estate licensees up to $10,000, and to provide 
revenue for education and research to improve the real estate profession and 
make it more responsible to the public. The Fund was not established to 
provide relief to judgment creditors beyond the $10,000 limit, but was 
established to provide a measure of relief to as ireny people as possible. 
The "per transaction" limit makes more sense than the "per person" 
interpretation, due to the fact that a "transaction" is the basis of the 
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relationship between claimants and real estate licensees. A transaction is 
the buying and selling of one piece of property, and encompasses the many 
smaller acts which make up the relationship between the parties. The 
McBrides, as a group, purchased one piece of property from Carter, and 
whatever harm he did to them, was within the context of that one real estate 
transaction. Regardless of hew neny parties there are to a transaction, it 
is clear that the legislature intended to limit recovery in each transaction 
to $10,000. 
The district court erred when it awarded the McBrides recovery 
from the Fund on an individ\ial basis so that they could collect the entire 
$23,000 in actual damages. The final judgment, which served as the basis for 
the claim against the Recovery Fund, did not make any finding of individual 
harm against the McBrides. The McBrides purchased the property as a single 
entity, they were injured by Carter's bad acts as an entity, and they took 
judgment against Carter as an entity. The trial court should not have reached 
back into the underlying judgment and assessed damages to the McBrides on an 
individual basis, since there was no evidence in that judgment, or before the 
court in this action, that demonstrated that each McBride had been injured 
individually and was entitled to 25 percent of the actual danages. 
The district court's interpretation of the Recovery Fund Act could 
have disastrous consequences. The "$10,000 per transaction" limitation is the 
first half of a conjunctive sentence. If the logic which was applied to the 
first half of the sentence is applied to the second half, the result could be 
that the Fund is liable for $50,000 "per person" per transaction, or $50,000 
per licensee per transaction. Either of these two possibilities would quickly 
bankrupt the fund. 
- 7 -
•The language of the Recovery Fund Act sets specific limits on the 
amount of money which can be recovered fran the fund on a "per transaction" 
basis. The use of general terms, such as "person" should not expand recovery 
which is limited by specific terminology. This Court should give effect to 
the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of the legislature in setting 
a limitation on recovery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CX3MMITTED AN ERROR OF LRW WHEN IT INTERPRETED 
THE $10,000 PER TRANSACTION LIMITATION IN UTAH CODE ANN, §61-2A-5(1) 
TO ALLOW EACH PARTY TO A REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION TO RECOVER UP TO 
$10,000 PER PERSON. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "although the Supreme Court may 
review both facts and law, it typically accords considerable deference to the 
judgment of the trial court due to its advantaged position and will not 
disturb the action of that court unless evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, or the trial court abuses its discretion and misapplies principles 
of law." Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). See also Hardy v. 
Hendrickson, 495 P.2d 28 (Utah 1972); Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 
1952; Stanley v. Stanley, 94 P.2d 465 (Utah 1939). In this case, the lower 
court misapplied Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l) (1953 as amended) by allowing 
each party in a single transaction to recover up to $10,000. This application 
of § 61-2a-5(l) is contrary to the express language of that statute and 
legislative intent. 
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A) The District Court's Interpretation Of The Term "Person" Is Contrary 
To The Utah Rules Of Construction And Gammon Law. 
In ruling on this case, Judge Eves focused on the phrase "A person may 
bring a claim against the Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery 
Fund . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l). The court determined the term 
"person" was singular and therefore that each person involved in a transaction 
could recover up to the $10,000 limit set in the last sentence in that 
subsection. Hcwever, this ruling is contrary to the rules of construction set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) and the ocmmon law. Section 68-3-
12(1)(a) provides that "the singular number includes the plural, and the 
plural the singular." A situation similar to this one occurred in Mprtgage 
Bankers Ass'n v. N.J. Real Estate Ccmnission, 491 A.2d 1317 (N.J. Super. A.D. 
1985), in which the court was interpreting a provision of the New Jersey Real 
Estate Recovery Fund statute which was drawn in terms of "either party," a 
phrase implying only two parties to the transaction. The court looked to 
N.J.S.A. 1:1-2, prescribing the rule of construction which stated that the use 
of the singular "shall be understood to include and to apply to several 
persons or parties as well as to one * * *." In the present case, the 
district court interpreted the term "person" as being singular. Hcwever, the 
rules of construction provide that the singular includes the plural and vice 
versa. Therefore, the term "person" should be interpreted to include a group 
of people as well as a singular person. 
This Court has dealt with the problem of interpreting statutory 
language on iteny occasions. In Hcwe v. Jackson, 421 P.2d 159 (Utah 1966), the 
Court addressed the issue of whether a statute which was drafted using the 
term "corporation" could be construed to include "persons". The Court held: 
. . . [T]here is no reason to believe that there was any intent to 
confer a privilege solely upon corporations and thus discriminate 
against an individual, a partnership or any other type of entity 
- 9 -
rendering such a service. Just as in most instances, when rights 
are conferred upon "persons/' it also includes corporations, the 
converse is true: Where it is essential to give a statute a fair, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory application/ the use of the term 
"corporation" should be deemed to include "persons." Id. at 161. 
Also, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 states that words and phrases are to be 
construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language. 
When used in context, the phrase "A person nay bring a claim . . ."is merely 
generic language allowing a claim to be brought against the Recovery Fund. 
The language which follows that phrase is the important part of the statute 
and clearly lays out the conditions precedent to filing a claim against the 
Recovery Fund. The critical language outlines the fact that a claimant must 
have a "final judgment" from a "court of competent jurisdiction in this state" 
and the claimant may file a "verified petition" only after the "termination of 
all proceedings including appeals" This language outlining the procedural 
aspects of filing a claim is followed by language which limits the claiitent to 
"uncollected actual damages," exclusive of "attorney's fees", ".interest", and 
"court costs." Then the statute very clearly and very specifically says, "No 
recovery from the fund may be more than $10,000 for a single transaction and 
no more than $50,000 for any one licensee." When read in the context in 
which intended, this statute clearly limits recovery from the fund to $10,000 
per transaction not per person involved in a transaction. 
Further supporting this interpretation is Osuala v. Aetna Life & 
Casualty, 608 P. 2d 242 (Utah 1980) which held that specific provisions prevail 
over more general expressions when determining the meaning or application of 
the provision of an act. As stated above, the term "person" is a general term 
used to represent individuals, partnerships, corporations, etc* In this 
statute "person" simply describes the entity with the judgment outlined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l). In contrast with the term "person" is the 
- i n . 
provision "per transaction" used in the phrase limiting recovery, which is 
more specific and a term of art. 'Therefore, if there is a conflict of 
interpretation, the specific term "per transaction" should prevail over the 
more general expression of "any person." 
B) A Statute Should Be Applied According To Its Literal Wording And 
Provisions Should Be Construed According To Generally Accepted 
Meanings, 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l) provides that "No recovery frcm the fund may 
be more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no more than $50,000 for any 
one licensee." Courts have held that if the meaning of language in a statute 
is clear and unambiguous, courts are but required to give it effect. Plutis 
Min, Co. v. Qnne, 289 P.2d 132 (Utah 1930). Further, in Pfest Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982), the court held that a statute should be 
applied according to its literal wording unless it is xmreasonably confused or 
inoperable. Citing Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 
(1967). This statute's literal wooxiing provides that "No recovery frcm the 
fund ray be more than $10,000 for a single transaction." To interpret the 
statute the way the district court has interpreted it would require inferring 
additional language, such as "not more than $10,000 per person involved in a 
single transaction." Hcwever, this statute is specifically worded to provide 
that only $10,000 shall be paid "per transaction" not per person involved in a 
transaction. 
The Court in West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446, further stated 
that "we must assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly ty the 
legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied according to its 
usually accepted meaning." See also Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244 (Utah App. 
1987). Generally a "transaction" consists of an act, agreement or several 
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acts or agreements between or among parties whereby a cause of action or 
alteration of legal rights occur. Miles v. Starks, 590 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1979). Further, it is a natter of common sense that a transaction may 
involve multiple parties. In this case, the statute clearly states that 
recovery frcm the fund shall be not more than $10,000 "per transaction" 
indicating that no matter hew many parties are involved in a transaction, they 
nay only recover up to $10,000. 
C) If A Statute Is Not Clear And Unambiguous, It Should Be Applied 
According To Legislative Intent And Purpose. 
Should this court determine that the statute is not clear and unambiguous 
then the legislative intent and purpose must be examined. In Osuala v. Aetna 
Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980), the court held that if there is 
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an 
act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its 
objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with legislative 
intent and purpose. The Utah Legislature enacted the Real Estate Recovery 
Fund Act for two purposes. First, to establish a fund to reimburse the public 
for danages incurred by defaulting real estate licensees up to $10,000, and 
secondly to provide revenue for education and research to improve the real 
estate profession and make it more responsible to the public. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2a-l, et seq. (1953 as amended). The Fund is not designed to provide 
relief to judgment creditors beyond the $10,000 limit. The purpose of the 
Fund is to provide a measure of relief to as many of those injured as 
possible, not to make each person injured by a defaulting real estate licensee 
whole. 
Cases cx^ nstruing similar Real Estate Recovery Fund statutes corroborate 
this statement of the purpose. In Doribalian v. Fox, 152 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Cal. 
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App. Ct. 1979), the plaintiffs listed property with a real estate agent. The 
real estate agent then cheated the plaintiffs by first not exposing the 
plaintiffs' property to the market as his professional obligations required 
him to do. He then submitted only one bid to the plaintiffs which he 
represented as being from a disinterested party when in fact it was his cwn 
bid, submitted under a false name. Relying on the real estate agent's 
representations that this offer was the best they could do, the plaintiffs 
accepted the agent's fraudulent offer for well belcw the fair market value of 
the property. Finally, the agent later forged the plaintiffs' initials on 
sane escrcw instructions, enabling the agent to convert $28,731.51 of the 
plaintiffs' money to his cwn use. The plaintiffs' claimed that the real 
estate agent defrauded them in two separate transactions, hcwever the 
California Court of Appeals held that there was only one real estate 
transaction because there was only one piece of property listed and sold. The 
real estate agent's several fraudulent acts were cormitted within the context 
of that single transaction. 
In the instant case, there was only one piece of property sold to the 
McBrides by Carter. Regardless of the number or nature of fraudulent acts 
ccranitted by Carter which injured plaintiffs, all of those acts were within 
the context of one real estate transaction. Therefore, only $10,000 may be 
recovered for that one real estate transaction according to the statute. 
Also, in Mortgage Bankers Ass'n v. N.J. Real Estate Commission, 491 A.2d 
1317 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1985), the court held that a statute authorizing the 
Real Estate Ccranission to take disciplinary action against a broker who was 
found guilty of collecting a cotmission as the broker in a transaction when at 
same time representing either party in the transaction in a different 
capacity, applies to multiparty transactions. The court reasoned that 
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"considering the broad range of services which a broker is authorized to 
perform by N.J.S.A. 45:15-3 and which can be perfconed in a single 
transaction, we are persuaded that reading subsection (i) as limited to a 2-
party transaction would abrogate legislative intent as well as cannon sense." 
To interpret the statute as the Fifth District Court has necessitates 
reading language into the statute which is not there and would be contrary to 
the express language and legislative intent. Such interpretation would 
require an assumption that although there was only one piece of property 
bought and sold, the number of buyers, regardless of hew they were related, 
determines the number of transactions involved. In this case that would nean 
there were four separate transactions on one property. This interpretation is 
erroneous and contrary to established case law and legislative intent. Case 
law has held that a transaction can involve multiple parties. The transaction 
involved in this case was the purchase of property fcy Respondents frcm Steven 
Carter. Although there were multiple parties involved in the transaction, 
they acted in concert and as one, purchasing one piece of property, therefore 
there was only one transaction. This single transaction entitles the McBrides 
to a total recovery of $10,000, not $23,000. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT ARBITRARILY ASSIGNED EACH OF THE POUR 
CO-PETITIONERS ONE-FOURTH OF THE DAMAGES FOUND IN THE UNDERLYDG 
JUDGMENT, WHEN THAT JUDGMENT FOUND THE PETITIONERS AS A GROUP WERE 
INJURED BY CARTER, AND DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE, OR MAKE A FINDING OF INJURY 
CN AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. 
There is no evidence that plaintiffs were injured individually by 
Carter's actions. The judgment submitted as the basis for the petition 
against the Recovery Fund irakes no distinction between the plaintiffs. 
Instead, it refers to them in the aggregate and made findings of actual 
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damges to then as a group. However, the district court, in applying the 
Recovery Fund Act, arbitrarily awarded each person involved in the transaction 
one-fourth of the actual damages of $23,000, or $5,750. This application of 
the statute without using an underlying judgment which assigned harm to 
individual plaintiffs would be inequitable and unmanageable. The court 
literally reached back into the original judgment and interpreted it to suit 
the claims in the petition against the Recovery Fund. In this case, the 
underlying action found injury to the McBrides as group and did not 
distinguish damages on an individual basis. Therefore, to arbitrarily award 
each individual a percentage of actual damages is not an equitable application 
of the statute since it is contraiy to the literal language of the statute and 
the interest of each McBrides was incapable of determination from the 
judgment. To allcw recovery on such a basis necessitates the court's 
determination that each party was entitled to 25 percent of the actual 
damages, when in fact there was no evidence to that effect before the court. 
Further, by definition the underlying judgment must be final, and therefore 
incapable of being altered fcy the subsequent action against the Recovery Fund. 
That underlying action must stand on its cwn, and be considered complete 
within the four-corners of the judgment. Any other holding would make cases 
of this type unmanageable, since each such interpretation would involve the 
Recovery Fund in more litigation, which was certainly not the legislature's 
intent when it specifically required that the underlying judgment be final. 
Therefore, the McBrides, whose a claim against the Recovery Fund was based on 
a judgment which shews that they were injured as a group of co-purchasers of 
property fran Carter, should only be entitled to recover as a group. 
If the district court's interpretation of the statute were adopted, 
additional interpretation problems would need to be addressed. Should the 
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District Court's reasoning be applied to the second half of the conjimctive 
sentence, "No recovery from the fund may be more than $10,000 for a single 
transaction and no more than $50,000 for any one licensee" disaster could 
result. If the district court's reasoning in this case were applied to the 
second half of that sentence, recovery could be interpreted as extending to 
$50,000 "per person" per licensee or $50,000 per licensee per transaction. 
The application of the District Court's interpretation of the Recovery Fund 
Act would render the Recovery Fund bankrupt, and thereby frustrate the 
purposes for which the fund was established. 
The Recovery Fund is self-funded frcm monies received fran licensees who 
are assessed fees every two years. At present, real estate brokers are 
assessed $15 per year, and salesagents are assessed $10 per year. The amount 
available in the Fund is determined by hew nany licensees renew their real 
estate licenses. Currently, there are an average of 100 licensees per month 
who do not rena^ their licenses, and therefore do not contribute to the 
recovery fund, although the fund remains liable for payment on their behalf 
for any conduct which occurred while they were licensed. This decline in 
licensees has resulted in a fewer monies going into the Recovery Fund. 
However, the number of claims against the Fund and monies paid out of the Fund 
are increasing. Consequently, the Fund is shrinking and if the District 
Court's interpretation is adopted, the Fund could be wiped out. Therefore, 
the Fifth District Court's interpretation, which contravenes other courts 
application of § 61-2a-5(l), should be rejected, and the statute interpreted 
in light of its literal wording which limits recovery to $10,000 for a single 




It is clear from the language in the Recovery Fund Act that recovery frcm 
the fund is on a "per transaction" basis, regardless of the number of 
claiitants involved in the transaction. To interpret the act so that each 
claimant could potentially recover $10,000 would frustrate the purpose of the 
fund, which is to allcw a measure of relief to as many injured parties as 
possible, and, potentially bankrupt the fund, thereby denying any relief to 
many having qualifying claims against defaulting real estate licensees. 
Therefore, the Division of Real Estate prays the Court reverse the 
Order of Judge Eves and rerand the case for the entry of an order in keeping 
with the statutory limit of $10,000 per transaction set by the legislature. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of January, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312) 
Attorney General of Utah 
SHEIlX PAGE (#4898)^ 
Assistant AttorneyLGfeneral 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1019 
- 17 -
MAILINS CERTIFICAIE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the following: 
John L. Miles 
Wright & Miles 
60 North 300 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
postage prepaid, this / day of January, 1989. 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
RL£& DON W. MCBRIDE, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEVEN R. CARTER, 
Defendant. 
DON W. MCBRIDE, et al, 
Petitioners/Respondents, 
v. 
THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
as Administrator of the Real 




Clerk. Supremo Court. Utah 
ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT 
OF TIME TO FILE 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 880365 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the reasons set forth in Appellant's 
Motion for Enlargement of Time and based upon the stipulation of the parties to 
this appeal, that the time for filing Appellant's brief is enlarged thirty (30) days, 
from December 9, 1988 to January 9, 1989. ,.; 
DATED this / l day of 6vk**id*4~~, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
V/<L)ft.6> 
/ U T A H SUPREMECOURT JUSTICE 
Approved as to form: 
John L. Miles 
Attorney for Petitioners/Respondents 
APPENDIX B 
WRIGHT 6 MILES 
John L. Miles 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
60 North 300 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-2612 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON W. McBRIDE & YVONNE Z. 
McBRIDE, husband and wife, and ] 
JAMES G. McBRIDE & PAULA S. 
McBRIDE, husband and wife. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEVEN R. CARTER; JANET C. 
MASON; SRC INVESTMENT COMPANY, ] 
A Utah Corporation; and AGUDO 
INC., A Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Petition Directed To: 
REAL ESTATE EDUCATION, RESEARCH, 
AND RECOVERY FUND, ] 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. 86-0646 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
hearing on July 12, 1988 on the plaintiffs1 petition for payment 
from the "Real Estate Education, Research, And Recovery Fund", 
One of the plaintiffs, Don W. McBridef appeared with plaintiffs' 
attorney, John L. Miles, who presented oral argument in support 
of the petition. Sheila Page, attorney for the Division of Real 
Estate of the Department of Business Regulation of the State of 
Utah ("Division") appeared on behalf of the Real Estate Recovery 
Fund and presented argument in opposition to the payment of more 
than $10,000,00 from the recovery fund. 
The Court, having reviewed the petition and the file in 
this matter, having considered the memorandum objecting to 
plaintiffs* recovering more than $10,000.00 from the recovery 
fund, and having considered the oral arguments presented by 
counsel for both parties, and good cause appearing therefore, 
hereby makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiffs have filed a proper petition and 
have met all conditions precedent and all conditions required by 
law for recovery from the real estate recovery fund. Further, 
that the Division, in its response to the petition, has 
acknowledged that plaintiffs are entitled to receive $10,000.00 
from the recovery fund. The Division contends that recovery is 
limited to $10,000.00 because there was only one transaction 
and that multiple claimaints harmed by one transaction are 
limited to $10,000.00 and must share therein. 
2. The Court finds that the applicable Utah statute 
should be the statute in effect at the time plaintiffs filed 
their petition for recovery from the real estate recovery fundf 
and not the statute in effect at the time the original complaint 
against the real estate licensee was filed or the statute in 
effect at the time the final judgment was entered against the 
real estate licensee. 
3. The Court finds that plaintiffs sustained actual 
damages of $23r000.00 which were included in the $34,026.31 
judgment against the real estate licensee. The Court further 
finds that none of the judgment has been collected. 
4. The Court finds that the statute in effect when the 
petition was filed on or about May 16f 1988 does not allow 
recovery for punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest or Court 
costs and that plaintiffs cannot recover more than $23,000.00 
from the recovery fund. 
5. The Court finds that the Utah Real Estate Recovery 
Fund Act is not clear in reference to instances where there are 
multiple claimants, but finds from the wording of the statute, 
Section 61-2a-5 of the Utah Code, that references therein that "A 
person may bring a claim. • ." and "If the person making a claim 
. . ." and also ". • • the person making the claim . • ." are all 
references to a single individual and that each individual who 
has sustained actual damages may bring a claim against the 
recovery fund with each claim being limited by the statute to 
2 
$10,000.00 for a single transaction. 
6. The Court finds that each of the four individual 
plaintiffs has suffered actual damages of $5,750.00 (being 
one-fourth of the $23,000.00 actual damages included in the 
judgment) and that each is entitled to receive $5,750.00 from the 
real estate recovery fund. 
7. The Court further finds that the statute is 
remedial and intended to protect the public against loss 
resulting from fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by real estate 
licensees and should therefore be given a liberal construction to 
promote that purpose. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of Fact, the Court 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the law in effect at the time the petition for 
recovery was filed in May, 1988 is the applicable law governing 
this case. 
2. That each of the four individual plaintiffs is 
entitled to recover $5,750.00 (being one-fourth of the $23,000.00 
actual damages included in the judgment) from the real estate 
recovery fund. 
3. That an Order should issue directing payment of 
$5,750.00 to each of the four plaintiffs, to-wit, Don W. McBride, 
Yvonne Z. McBride, James G. McBride, and Paula S. McBride, said 
payments to be made from the Real Estate Education, Research, and 
Recovery Fund. / 
DATED this i/A ~ day of July, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
WRIGHT & MILES 
John L. Miles 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
60 North 300 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-2612 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON W. McBRIDE & YVONNE Z. 
McBRIDE, husband and wife, and 
JAMES G. McBRIDE & PAULA S. 
McBRIDE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEVEN R. CARTER; JANET C. 
MASON; SRC INVESTMENT COMPANY, ] 
A Utah Corporation; and AGUDO 
INC., A Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Petition Directed To: 
REAL ESTATE EDUCATION, RESEARCH, 
AND RECOVERY FUND, ] 
) ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT 
FROM THE REAL ESTATE 
) EDUCATION, RESEARCH, AND 
RECOVERY FUND 
I Civil No. 86-0646 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
hearing on July 12, 1988 on the plaintiffs1 petition for payment 
from the "Real Estate Education, Research, And Recovery Fund". 
One of the plaintiffs, Don W. McBride, appeared with plaintiffs' 
attorney, John L. Miles, who presented oral argument in support 
of the petition. Sheila Page, attorney for the Division of Real 
Estate of the Department of Business Regulation of the State of 
Utah ("Division") appeared on behalf of the Real Estate Recovery 
Fund and presented argument in opposition to the payment of more 
than $10,000.00 from the recovery fund. 
The Court, having reviewed the petition and the file in 
this matter, having considered the memorandum objecting to 
plaintiffs* recovering more than $10,000.00 from the recovery 
fund, and having considered the oral arguments presented by 
counsel for both parties, and having previously made and entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Division of Real Estate 
of the Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah 
is directed and ordered to pay from the Real Estate Education, 
Research, and Recovery Fund the sum of $5,750,00 to each of the 
four plaintiffs, namely, Don W. McBride, Yvonne Z. McBride, James 
G. McBride, and Paula S. McBride, for a total payment of 
$23,000.00, the aggregate amount of uncollected actual damages 
included in the judgment and unpaid. 
DATED this $(~ day of July, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Philip Ev 
istrict Couft Judge 
APPENDIX C 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
Attorney General of Utah 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN (#2891) 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
SHEILA PAGE (#4898) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)538-1019 
oooooOooooo 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooooOooooo 
DON W. MCBRIDE, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
STEVEN R. CARTER, Civil No. 86-0646 
Defendant. 
oooooOooooo 
NOTICE is hereby given that the Division of Real Estate of the 
Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah ("Division"), by and 
through counsel, Sheila Page, Assistant Attorney General, hereby appeals to the 
Utah Court of Appeals from the Judgment rendered by the Honorable J. Philip 
Eves in the above entitled matter, which Judgment was entered July 28, 1988. 
The Division is an agency of state government and is exempted from 
the filing of fees by Utah Code Ann. §§ 21-2-2, 21-7-2,1953, as amended. The 
Division is also exempt from the requirement of posting a bond pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-12, 1953, as amended. 
APPENDIX D 
CHAPTER 2a 
REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND 
61-2a-l. Citation. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Real Estate 
Recovery Fund Act." 
61-2a-2• Purpose. 
The purposes of this chapter are as follows: 
(1) To establish a Real Estate Education, Research and 
Recovery Fund that shall reimburse the public out of the fund 
for damages incurred by defaulting real estate licensees up 
to $10,000. 
(2) To provide revenue for improving the real estate 
profession through education and research with the goal of 
making real estate salesmen more responsible to the public. 
61-2a-3. Education, Research and Recovery Fund. 
There is created a segregated special fund to be known as the 
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund. At the 
commencement of each fiscal year, $100,000 shall be available in 
the fund for satisfying judgments rendered against persons 
licensed under Chapter 2, Title 61. 
61-2a-4. Additional license fee - Purpose. 
Every person who applies for or renews a real estate principal 
broker or associate broker license shall pay, in addition to the 
application or renewal fee, a reasonable fee determined by the 
Division of Real Estate with the concurrence of the Real Estate 
Commission of not in excess of $18. Every person who applies for 
or renews a real estate sales agent license shall pay in addition 
to the application or renewal fee a reasonable fee determined by 
the division with the concurrence of the commission of not in 
excess of $12. These additional fees shall be paid into the Real 
Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund to be used for the 
purposes of this chapter. 
61-2a-5. Notice to division - Judgment against real estate 
licensee - Fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit -
Verified petition for order directing payment 
from fund - Limitations and procedure. 
(1) A person may bring a claim against the Real Estate 
Education, Research, and Recovery Fund only if he provides 
written notice to the Division of Real Estate at the time he 
files an action against a real estate licensee alleging fraud, 
misrepresentation, or deceit. Within 30 days of receipt of the 
notice, the division shall have an unconditional right to 
intervene in the action. If the person making a claim against 
the fund obtains a final judgment in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in this state against the licensee based upon fraud, 
misrepresentation, or deceit in any real estate transaction, the 
person making the claim may, upon termination of all proceedings 
including appeals, file a verified petition in the court where 
the judgment was entered for an order directing payment from the 
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund for the 
uncollected actual damages included in the judgment and unpaid. 
Recovery from the fund may not include punitive damages, 
attorney's fees, interest, or court costs. No recovery from the 
fund may be more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no 
more than $50,000 for any one licensee. 
(2) A copy of the petition shall be served upon the Division 
of Real Estate of the Department of Business Regulation, and an 
affidavit of the service shall be filed with the court. 
(3) The court shall conduct a hearing on the petition within 
30 days after service. The petitioner shall recover from the 
fund only if he shows all of the following: 
(a) He is not the spouse of the judgment debtor or the 
personal representative of the spouse. 
(b) He has complied with this chapter. 
(c) He has obtained a final judgment in the manner 
prescribed under this section, indicating the amount of the 
judgment awarded. 
(d) He has proved the amount still owing on the 
judgment at the date of the petition. 
(e) He has had a writ of execution issued upon the 
judgment, and the officer executing the writ has made a 
return showing that no property subject to execution in 
satisfaction of the judgment could be found. If execution 
is levied against the property of the judgment debtor, the 
petitioner shall show that the amount realized was 
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, and shall indicate the 
amount realized and the balance remaining on the judgment 
from the assets of the judgment debtor. 
(4) If the petitioner satisfies the court that it is not 
practicable for him to comply with one or more of the 
requirements enumerated in Subsections (3)(e) and (f), the court 
may waive those requirements. 
61-2a-6. Real Estate Division - Authority to act upon 
receipt of petition. 
(1) Upon receipt of a petition as required by § 61-2a-5, the 
Real Estate Division may answer, initiate review proceedings of 
its own, or appear in any proceeding in the name of the defendant 
to the action or on behalf of the fund. 
(2) The division may, subject to court approval, compromise a 
claim based upon the application of a petitioner. 
61-2a-7. Court determination and order. 
If the court determines that a claim should be levied against 
that portion of the fund allocated for the purpose of carrying 
out the provisions of this act, the court shall enter an order 
directed to the division requiring payment from the fund of that 
portion of the petitioner's judgment that is payable from the 
fund pursuant to the provisions of and in accordance with the 
limitations contained in § 61-2a-5. 
61-2a-8. Insufficient funds to satisfy judgments -
Procedure and interest. 
If the money deposited in the fund and allotted for satisfying 
judgments against licensees is insufficient to satisfy any 
authorized claim for payment, the division shall, when sufficient 
money has been deposited in the fund, satisfy the unpaid claims 
in the order that they were originally filed, together with 
accumulated interest at the rate of 8% per annum. 
61-2a-9. Division subrogated to judgment creditor -
Authority to revoke license. 
If the division makes payment from the fund to a judgment 
creditor, the division shall be subrogated to all the rights of 
the judgment creditor for the amounts paid out of the fund and 
any amount and interest recovered by the division shall be 
deposited in the fund. The license of any real estate licensee 
for whom payment from the fund is made under this chapter shall 
be automatically revoked. The licensee may not apply for a new 
license until the amount paid out on his account, plus interest 
at a rate determined by the Division of Real Estate with the 
concurrence of the commission, has been repaid in full. A 
discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve a licensee from the 
penalties and obligations of this section 
61-2a-10. Failure to comply with all provisions constitutes 
a waiver. 
The failure of any person to comply with the provisions of 
this chapter shall constitute a waiver of any rights provided 
under it. 
61-2a-ll. Director of department of business regulation -
Authority to take disciplinary action not limited. 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall limit the authority of 
the director of the Department of Business Regulation to take 
disciplinary action against a licensee for a violation of any of 
the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 61, or of the rules and 
regulations of the Real Estate Division. The repayment in full 
of all obligations to the fund by any licensee does not nullify 
or modify the effect of any other disciplinary proceeding brought 
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 61 or the rules 
and regulations promulgated by the commission. 
61-2a-12. Moneys accumulated - Excess set aside - Purpose. 
Any of the money accumulated in the Real Estate Education, 
Research and Recovery Fund in excess of $100,000 shall be set 
aside and segregated to be used by the Real Estate Division in 
carrying out the advancement of education and research in the 
field of real estate, including courses sponsored by the 
division, offered by the division in conjunction with any 
university or college in the state, or provided for by 
contracting for a particular research project in the field of 
real estate for the state. 
68-3-12. Rules of construction. 
(1) In the construction of these statutes, the following 
general rules shall be observed, unless such construction would 
be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature or 
repugnant to the context of the statute: 
(a) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural 
the singular. 
(b) Words used in one gender comprehend the other. 
(c) Words used in the present tense include the future. 
68-3-11 Rules of construction as to words and phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context 
and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and 
phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be 
construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or 
definition. 
